Everything about The Red Army Invasion Of Georgia totally explained
The
Red Army invasion of Georgia also known as the
Soviet-Georgian War (
February 15 –
March 17 1921) was a military campaign by the
Soviet Russian (RSFSR)
Red Army against the
Democratic Republic of Georgia (DRG) aimed at overthrowing the local
Social-Democratic (
Menshevik) government and installing the
Bolshevik regime in the country. The conflict was a result of expansionist policy by the Soviets, who aimed at control of the same territories, which had been part of
Imperial Russia until the turbulent events of
World War I, as well as the revolutionary efforts of mostly Russia-based
Georgian Bolshevik elite, who didn't enjoy sufficient support in their native country to seize power without foreign intervention.
Independence of the DRG had been recognized by Russia in the
May 7 1920 treaty and the invasion of Georgia wasn't universally agreed upon in
Moscow. It was largely engineered by two influential Georgia-born Soviet officials –
Joseph Stalin and
Grigoriy (Sergo) Ordzhonikidze, who obtained, on
February 14 1921, a consent of the Soviet leader,
Vladimir Lenin, to advance into Georgia on the pretext of supporting the "peasants and workers rebellion" in the country. The Soviet forces took the Georgian capital
Tbilisi (then known as
Tiflis to most non-
Georgian speakers) after heavy fighting and declared the
Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic on
February 25, 1921. The rest of the country was overrun within three weeks, but it wasn't until September
1924 that the Soviet rule was firmly established. Almost simultaneous occupation of a large portion of southwest Georgia by
Turkey (February-March 1921) threatened to develop into a crisis between Moscow and
Ankara and led to significant territorial concessions by the Soviets to the Turkish National Government in the
Treaty of Kars.
Background
Georgia effectively wrested out of Russian control in the chaotic aftermath of the
February Revolution in Russia in
1917. After an abortive attempt to unite with
Armenia and
Azerbaijan into
a federative state, Georgian leaders proclaimed the country’s independence as the Democratic Republic of Georgia on
May 26 1918. Through sporadic conflicts with its neighbors and occasional outbreaks of civil strife, Georgia managed to maintain its precarious independence and achieved more or less firm control over its newly established borders in the troubled years of the
Russian Civil War.
Despite relatively high public support and some successful reforms, the Social Democratic leadership of Georgia failed to create a stable economy and build a strong and disciplined army that could be able to oppose the easily predictable Bolshevik advent. Although there were a significant number of highly qualified officers who had served in the
Imperial Russian military, the army was underfed and poorly equipped. A parallel military structure, the
People’s Guard of Georgia, was recruited from the members of the Menshevik Party, and was hence more honored and disciplined, but dominated by party functionaries and highly politicized.
Prelude to the war
Since early
1920, the local Bolsheviks were actively fomenting political unrest in Georgia, capitalizing on agrarian disturbances in rural areas and inter-ethnic tensions within the country. The operational centre of the Soviet military-political forces in the
Caucasus was the Kavburo (Caucasian
Bureau), attached to the
Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. Set up in February 1920, this body was presided by the Georgian Bolshevik
Grigoriy Ordzhonikidze, with
Sergei Kirov as his deputy. While the
Allied powers were preoccupied with the
Turkish War of Independence, the
Sovietization of the Caucasus appeared to the Bolshevik leaders an easier task. Furthermore, the
Ankara-based Turkish national government led by
Kemal Pasha expressed its full commitment to a close co-operation with Moscow, promising to compel "Georgia… and Azerbaijan… to enter into union with Soviet Russia… and… to undertake military operations against the expansionist Armenia."
Despite the peace treaty, an eventual overthrow of the Menshevik-dominated government of Georgia was both intended and planned. With its well-established diplomatic ties with several
European nations and its control of strategic transit routes from the Black Sea to the Caspian, Georgia was viewed by the Soviet leadership as “an advance post of the
Entente”. Another reason why it was thought impossible to allow the Georgian government to stay in power was the Bolsheviks’ desire to take revenge on the Russian Mensheviks in European exile whose
anti-Soviet propaganda couldn't so easily be silenced. By that time, the
British expeditionary corps had completely evacuated the Caucasus and the
West was reluctant to intervene in support of Georgia.
However, Russian military intervention wasn't universally agreed upon in Moscow and there was considerable disagreement among the Bolshevik leaders on how to deal with the southern neighbor. The
People's Commissar of Nationalities Affairs,
Joseph Stalin, who had, by the end of the Civil War, already accumulated a remarkable amount of bureaucratic power in his own hands, took a particularly hard line with his native Georgia, strongly supporting a military overthrow of the Georgian government and continuously urging Lenin to give his consent to advance into Georgia. The People's Commissar of War,
Leon Trotsky, strongly disagreed with what he described as a “premature intervention” explaining that the population would be able to carry the revolution. Pursuant to his national policy on the right of nations to
self-determination, Lenin had initially rejected use of force, calling for extreme caution in order to ensure that the Russian factor would help and not dominate the Georgian revolution. However, as victory in the Civil War drew ever closer, Moscow’s actions became less restrained and, for many Bolsheviks, self-determination was increasingly "a diplomatic game which has to be played in certain cases".
According to Moscow, relations with Georgia deteriorated over alleged violations of the peace treaty, re-arrests of Georgian Bolsheviks, obstruction of the passage of convoys passing through to Armenia, and a suspicion that Georgia was aiding armed rebels in the
North Caucasus.
Red Army invasion
The tactics used by the Soviets to gain control of Georgia were similar to those applied in Azerbaijan and Armenia in 1920, for example, to send in the Red Army while encouraging local Bolsheviks to stage unrest. However, this policy was rather difficult to implement in Georgia, where the Communist party didn't enjoy popular support and remained an isolated political force.
On the night of
11 to
12 February 1921, with the instigation of Ordzhonikidze, the Bolsheviks attacked local Georgian military posts in the ethnic
Armenian district of
Lorri and the nearby village of Shulaveri, near the Armenian and Azerbaijani borders. The Armenia-based Red Army units quickly came to an aid of the insurrection, though without Moscow's formal approval. When the Georgian government protested to the Soviet envoy in Tbilisi,
Aron Sheinman, about the incidents, he denied any Russian involvement and declared that any disturbances which might be taking place must be a spontaneous revolt by the Armenian communists. Meanwhile, the Bolsheviks had already set up a Georgian Revolutionary Committee (Georgian
Revkom) in Shulaveri, a body that would soon acquire the functions of a rival government. Chaired by a Georgian Bolshevik
Filipp Makharadze, the Revkom formally applied to Moscow for help.
Disturbances erupted also in the town of
Dusheti and
among Ossetians in northeast Georgia who resented the Georgian government’s refusal to grant them autonomy. Georgian forces managed to contain the disorders in some areas, but the preparations for a Soviet intervention were already being set in train. When the Georgian army moved to Lorri to crush the revolt, Lenin finally gave in to the repeated requests of Stalin and Ordzhonikidze to allow the Red Army to invade Georgia, on the pretext of aiding a staged uprising, and establish Bolshevik power. An ultimate decision was made on the
February 14 meeting of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party:
At dawn on
February 16, the main 11th Red Army troops under
Anatoli Gekker crossed into Georgia and started the
Tiflis Operation aimed at capturing the capital of Georgia. At the battle on the
Khrami River, the Georgian border forces under General Stephan Akhmeteli were overwhelmed and suffered a defeat. Retreating westward, the Georgian commander General Tsulukidze blew up railway bridges and demolished roads in an effort to delay the enemy’s advance. Simultaneously, Red Army units marched to Georgia from the north through the
Daryal and
Mamisoni passes and along the
Black Sea coast towards
Sukhumi. While these events were proceeding, the
Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs issued a series of statements disclaiming all knowledge of military actions between Georgia and the Red Army, and professing willingness to mediate in any disputes which have arisen within Georgia. On
February 24, the Georgian commander-in-chief,
Giorgi Kvinitadze, in an untenable position, bowed to the inevitable and ordered a withdrawal to save his army form complete encirclement and the city from destruction. The Georgian government and
Constituent Assembly evacuated for Kutaisi, western Georgia.
On
February 25, the triumphant Red Army entered Tbilisi and the Bolshevik soldiers engaged in wide-spread looting. The
Revkom headed by
Mamia Orakhelashvili and
Shalva Eliava ventured into the capital and proclaimed the overthrow of the Menshevik government, the dissolution of the Georgian National Army and People’s Guard, and the formation of a
Georgian Soviet Republic. On the same day, in Moscow, Lenin received the congratulations of his commissars – "The red banner blows over Tbilisi. Long live Soviet Georgia!"
Kutaisi Operation
The Georgian commanders planned to concentrate their forces at the town of
Mtskheta, northwest to Tbilisi, and to continue battle on the new lines of defense. The fall of the capital, however, heavily demoralized the Georgian troops who had finally to abandon their positions at Mtskheta. The army was gradually disintegrating as it continued its retreat westward, offering largely unorganized, but sometimes fierce resistance to the advancing Russian troops. It took another two weeks to the Soviets to take hold of major cities and towns of eastern Georgia.
The Mensheviks entertained hopes of aid from a
French naval squadron cruising in the Black Sea off the Georgian coast. On March 8, Turkish troops under Colonel Kizim-Bey took up defensive positions surrounding the city, leading to a crisis with Soviet Russia.
Georgy Chicherin, Soviet
People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, submitted a protest note to
Ali Fuat Pasha, the Turkish representative in Moscow. In response Ali Fuat handed two notes to the Soviet government. The Turkish notes claimed that the Turkish armies were just providing security to the local
Muslim elements which were put under threat by the Soviet military operations in the region. and the population was solidly anti-Bolshevik. In
1922, a strong public resentment over the forcible Sovietization indirectly reflected in the opposition of Soviet Georgian authorities to Moscow’s centralizing policies promoted by
Dzerzhinsky, Stalin and Ordzhonikidze. The problem, known in modern history writing as the "
Georgian Affair", was to become one of the major points at issue between Stalin and Trotsky in the last years of Lenin's leadership
In Georgia, an intellectual resistance to the Bolshevik regime and occasional outbreaks of guerilla warfare evolved into a major
rebellion in August 1924. Its failure and the ensuing wave of large-scale repressions orchestrated by the emerging Soviet security officer,
Lavrentiy Beria, heavily demoralized the Georgian society and exterminated its most active pro-independence part. Within a week, from
August 29 to
September 5, 1924, 12,578 people, chiefly
nobles and intellectuals, were executed and over 20,000 exiled to
Siberia. that "the [SovietRussian] deployment of troops in Georgia and seizure of its territory was, from a legal point of view, a military interference (intervention) and occupation aimed at changing the existing political regime." At an extraordinary session of the
Supreme Soviet of the Georgian SSR convened on
May 26 1990, the Sovietization of Georgia was officially denounced as "an occupation and effective annexation of Georgia by Soviet Russia."
Further Information
Get more info on 'Red Army Invasion Of Georgia'.
|
External Link Exchanges
Do you know how hard it is to get a link from a large encyclopaedia? Well we're different and will prove it. To get a link from us just add the following HTML to your site on a relevant page:
<a href="http://red_army_invasion_of_georgia.totallyexplained.com">Red Army invasion of Georgia Totally Explained</a>
Then simply click through this link from your web page. Our crawlers will verify your link, extract the title of your web page and instantly add a link back to it. If you like you can remove the words Totally Explained and embed the link in article text.
As long as your link remains in place, we'll keep our link to you right here. Please play fair - our crawlers are watching. Your site must be closely related to this one's topic. Any kind of spamming, dubious practises or removing the link will result in your link from us being dropped and, potentially, your whole site being banned. |
